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We present a version of Lyapunov’s direct method for stability of a set under a
differential inclusion. We pay careful attention to the assumption of forward invari-
ance of a basin of attraction, which is often overlooked when applying the method
to local stability. Even if the value of a local Lyapunoov function monotonically
changes in some neighborhood of the limit set, this alone does not prevent a trajec-
tory from escaping from this particular neighborhood. In this note, we verify that
we can construct a smaller but forward invariant neighborhood. As a corollary, we
obtain a transitivity theorem on basins of attractions without requiring forward in-
variance.
Keywords: Lyapunov function, stability of a set, forward invariance, evolutionary
dynamics.
1 Introduction
We present a version of Lyapunov’s direct method for stability of a set under a differ-
ential inclusion. Specifically, our version in this paper differs from known versions for
differential inclusions as i) the limit can be a set, not necessarily a single point as in
Smirnov (2001); Bacciotti and Ceragioli (1999) and ii) a sufficient condition is based on
only local information (derivative with respect to state variable) of a Lyapunov function
at each point around the limit, not requiring information about intertemporal changes in
the value of the Lyapunov function or its time derivative as in Benaı̈m et al. (2005). Our
first motivation for this note is to serve as a handy reference for applications by reducing
the burden of proof and making these points explicit. Our version is particularly useful
for a practitioner (say, a game theorist) to prove local stability of a set when the basin of
*A chat with Bill Sandholm at Stony Book in 2016 led me to paying attention to the assumption of
invariance and to realizing the merits of theorems in this paper. (I still remember the chat at a parking lot
of Hilton Garden Inn after our lunch.) As well as uncountably many inputs and encouragements, I owe so
much to Bill.
†Graduate School of Economics and Management and Policy Design Lab, Tohoku University. E-mail:
ZusaiDPublic@gmail.com.
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attraction, which must be forward invariant, is not known for the practitioner. Further-
more, this allows us to verify transitivity of stability of sets from Lyapunov functions.
The idea of Lyapunov stability theorem or Lyapunov’s direct method appeals to in-
tuition: if we find a mapping (Lyapunov function) from the current state of a dynamic to
a real number such that i) the function attains a local minimum only at an equilibrium
(possibly a set) and ii) its value decreases as long as the current state has not reached
the equilibrium, then the equilibrium is stable under the dynamic. With this idea on
hand, we hope to tell local stability without identifying a solution path; we just find a
Lyapunov function and see how its value changes in a neighborhood of an equilibrium.
So, we typically find a neighborhood where the decrease in the Lyapunov function is
guaranteed, which we call here a monotone decreasing neighborhood; one might expect this
neighborhood to be a basin of attraction.
However, a basin of attraction must be forward invariant. (This does not matter
for global stability, of course.) Even if we find a monotone decreasing neighborhood, a
solution path may escape from this neighborhood and eventually the Lyapunov function
may not decrease after the escape. This imposes an additional burden of proof, losing an
appeal of the theorem to intuition since we eventually need to identify a solution path.
Similarly, we would expect transitivity of stable sets based on Lyapunov functions.
That is, if we find a Lyapunov function that decreases in X1 and attains the minimum
in X2 and another that decreases in X2 and attains the minimum in X∗, then we expect
X∗ to be stable in X1. Again, the known version of the transitivity theorems as in Con-
ley (1978) requires X1 to be forward invariant and X2 to be forward and also strongly
negative (i.e., backward) invariant.1
In applications to economics or game theory, we hope to find a Lyapunov function
from economic intuition. Under an evolutionary dynamic in a game, an aggregate of
agents’ possible gains from adjustment of their choices can be used as a candidate for a
Lyapunov function once we find a neighborhood where an agent’s revision of the choice
incurs negative payoff externality to others’ gains from further changes; generality of this
proof strategy is verified by Zusai (2020). This neighborhood is a monotone decreasing
neighborhood. However, forward invariance needs more mathematical examination of
the dynamic system itself, which may not be appealing to economic intuition.
In this paper, we reduce the burden of proof by showing that we can construct a
forward invariant (smaller) neighborhood from a monotone decreasing neighborhood.
This is a unique issue for local stability and has been overlooked when one applies a
theorem on global stability to local stability by analogy; as far as the author finds, this
issue is also not explicitly solved in known proofs as in Smirnov (2001). Our proof fixes
this hole. Further, this helps us to establish a transitivity theorem without requiring
forward or negative invariance.
We consider a differential inclusion (a set-valued differential equation) and conver-
1Strong negative invariance of X means that, if a solution path (starting at time 0) visits X at any time
t ≥ 0, then it must have started from X at time 0.
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gence to an equilibrium set, not necessarily a point. This generalization is needed to
cover evolutionary dynamics in games, since Nash equilibrium may constitute a (con-
nected) set and also a transition vector may not be uniquely specified when there are
multiple best responses.
In the next section, we present our theorems with quick summary of necessary nota-
tion and concepts. We discuss applications in evolutionary game theory in Section 3. In
Section 4, this leads to comparison of our theorems with those in preceding literature to
highlight significance of our theorem, exemplified in those applications. The proofs are
given in Section 5.
2 Definitions and theorems
We consider an autonomous differential inclusion V : X ⇒ TX on a compact metric
A-dimensional real space X ⊂ RA with A < ∞, such as
ẋ ∈ V(x) at each x ∈ X .
TX stands for the tangent space of X .2 As a solution concept for the differential inclu-
sion, we adopt a Carathéodory solution; that is, a solution trajectory {xt}t≥0 must be
Lipschitz continuous at every t ≥ 0 and also differentiable with derivative ẋt ∈ V(xt)
at almost every t. To guarantee the existence of a solution trajectory from an arbitrary
point x0 ∈ X , we assume that correspondence (set-valued mapping) V is bounded and
upper semicontinuous, with compact and convex values (Smirnov, 2001, Ch. 4).
Let X∗ be a nonempty closed set. We say X∗ is Lyapunov stable under V if for any
open neighborhood O of X∗ there exists a neighborhood O′ of A such that every solution
path {xt}t≥0 that starts from O′ remains in O.3 X∗ is attracting if there is a neighborhood
O of X∗ such that every solution that starts in O converges to X∗; O is called a basin of
attraction to X∗. If it is the entire space X , then we say X∗ is globally attracting. X∗ is
asymptotically stable if it is Lyapunov stable and attracting; it is globally asymptotically
stable if it is Lyapunov stable and globally attracting. In this paper, we prove Theorem 1
and corollary 1.
Lyapunov’s direct method
Theorem 1 (Lyapunov stability theorem). Let X∗ be a non-empty closed set in a compact
metric space X ⊂ RA with tangent space TX , and X′ be an open neighborhood of X∗. Suppose
that continuous function W : X → R and lower semicontinuous function W̃ : X → R satisfy
(a) W(x) ≥ 0 and W̃(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X′ and (b) cl X′ ∩W−1(0) = cl X′ ∩ W̃−1(0) = X∗.
2Henceforth the definitions follow Sandholm (2010b).
3This allows a solution path to transit between points in X∗. It is indeed a case for the best response
dynamic in a connected set of Nash equilibria.) Because of this, our set-wise stability notion is weaker than
stability of each point in X∗.
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In addition, assume that W is Lipschitz continuous in x ∈ X′. If a differential inclusion V :
X → TX satisfies4
DW(x)ẋ ≤ W̃(x) for any ẋ ∈ V(x) (1)
whenever W is differentiable at x ∈ X′, then X∗ is asymptotically stable under V .
W is a Lyapunov function; we call W̃ a decaying rate function and X′ a monotone
decreasing neighborhood. Note that we allow for multiplicity of transition vectors,
while requiring functions W and W̃ to be well defined (the uniqueness of the values)
as functions of state variable x, independently of the choice of transition vector ẋ from
V(x).
Generally speaking, in Lyapunov’s direct method, monotone decrease in the value of
the Lyapunov function W along with a solution trajectory to zero implies convergence
to zeros of W. In our version, condition (1) guarantees monotone decrease along with
any solution path starting from some neighborhood of X∗, possibly smaller than X′,
only based on local information on the derivative of W at each state x without requiring
explicit identification of the solution trajectory. Notice that we do not assume forward
invariance of X′. Thus, it is possible that a solution trajectory may escape from X′ and
then W may eventually increase; see Fig. 1. Therefore, X′ itself may not be a basin of
attraction to X∗. Yet, our theorem guarantees asymptotic stability of X∗ since we can
construct a forward invariant set from a subset of X′.
In a standard Lyapunov stability theorem (e.g. Robinson (1998, §5.5.3)) for a differen-
tial equation, a decaying rate function W̃ is not explicitly required while Ẇ is assumed to
be (strictly) negative until x reaches the limit set X∗. The most significant difference is the
requirement of lower semicontinuity of W̃. This assures the existence of a lower bound
on the decaying rate Ẇ(x) ≤ w̄ < 0 over any solution trajectories in a hypothetical case
in which x remained out of an arbitrarily small neighborhood of X∗ for an arbitrarily
long period of time. This excludes the possibility that x would stay out there forever and
guarantees convergence to X∗ (not only Lyapunov stability, i.e., no asymptotic escape
from X∗).
Lyapunov-based transitivity theorem.
Corollary 1 (Transitivity theorem). Let X1, X2, and X∗ be three non-empty subsets of a com-
pact metric spaceX such that X1 ⊃ X2 ⊃ X∗; assume that X∗ is closed and X1 is open. Suppose
that two Lipschitz continuous functions W1, W2 : X → R and two lower semicontinuous func-
tions W̃1, W̃2 : X → R satisfy the following assumptions: for any x ∈ X1,
a) i) W1(x) ≥ 0, ii) W̃1(x) ≤ 0, and iii) cl X1 ∩W1−1(0) = cl X1 ∩ W̃−11 (0) = cl X2;
b) i) W2(x) ≥ 0, ii)
[
x ∈ X2 ⇒ W̃2(x) ≤ 0
]
, and iii) cl X2 ∩W2−1(0) = cl X2 ∩ W̃−12 (0) =
X∗;
4D denotes differentiation, so DW(x) = dW/dx(x) = [∂W/∂x1(x), . . . , ∂W/∂xA(x)].
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Figure 1: A worrisome situation. Here w0 > w1 > w2 and Ẇ is negative in the area
within the red dashed curve (inside toward X∗); X′ is contained in this area. Along
a green solution trajectory, the value of W decreases until it crosses the red curve but
increases after it and escapes from X∗. Notice that, without forward invariance of X′,
the solution trajectory leaves it while W is still decreasing.
c) W̃1(x) + W̃2(x) ≤ 0.
Furthermore, assume that
a-iv) DW1(x)ẋ ≤ W̃1(x), b-iv) DW2(x)ẋ ≤ W̃2(x) for any ẋ ∈ V(x),
whenever W1 and W2 are differentiable at x ∈ X1. Then, X∗ is asymptotically stable under V .
One might expect the set of conditions in b) to imply asymptotic stability of X∗
thanks to Theorem 1. But here X2 may not be an open set. In particular, as we will
see in Section 3, we want to cover a case where X2 is just a hyperplane in X as in Fig-
ure 2; for example on evolution in a population game, X∗ can be a set of Nash equilibria
and X2 is a set of states where strictly dominated strategies are not used. Then, X2 is not
open. Of course, X2 may not be invariant; indeed, the known transitivity theorem as in
Conley (1978) would require an interim set X2 to be both forward and backward (neg-
ative) invariant. However, to appeal to intuition, a practitioner may hope to establish
asymptotic stability of X∗ by first constructing a Lyapunov function on X1 for stability
of X2 and then another that would work on the hyperplane X2 .
We fix this gap by imposing c). Since we assume openness of X1 in a), the set of
conditions in a) indeed implies asymptotic stability of cl X2. W1 stops decreasing once
a solution trajectory reaches X2, while W2 may have increased before that. So, either
one of them alone is not enough to serve as a Lyapunov function for convergence to X∗.
Condition c) essentially implies that a proper linear combination of these two functions






Figure 2: Pseudo-transitivity theorem. Here X∗ is a singleton of a point on the line
segment X2. Notice that X2 is not open in X .
3 Applications in game theory
The merit of our theorems lies in allowing a practitioner to verify a Lyapunov function
just by finding a neighborhood of the limit set where the value of the Lyapunov func-
tion decreases, without worry about possibilities that a solution trajectory might escape
from this neighborhood. This reduces a burden of proof significantly and leads to an
intuitively natural proof, as we discuss here.
Stability of an equilibrium has been a fundamental issue in economic theory and
game theory. An economic model typically focuses on the payoff structure, i.e., how pay-
offs (returns of choices) are determined from choices of agents in the model. Economists
argue that if payoffs negatively respond to perturbation of agents’ choices from equi-
librium, it should drive agents to returning to equilibrium. Economists regard such a
negative feedback of payoffs as a (sufficient) condition for stability, calling static stability.
By explicitly formulating agents’ processes of revising their choices (that is, an evolu-
tionary dynamic in economic sense, see Sandholm (2010b)), evolutionary game theorists
have attempted to test if such a negative feedback of payoffs indeed assure asymptotic
stability of an equilibrium.
Concrete formulation of static stability differs by specification of a game and the con-
text of analysis. Here we specifically consider a population game in a strategic form, a
predominant playground in evolutionary game theory. A population game consists of
a large population of agents, each of which makes an independent decision. In a strate-
gic form, an agent’s decision is a choice of a “strategy” from a given strategy set, say
S = {1, . . . , S}. Each strategy s ∈ S yields payoff Fs(x) ∈ R, depending on distribu-
tion of agents over the strategies x = (xs)s∈S ∈ ∆S := {x = (xs)s∈S ∈ RS | xs ≥
0∀s ∈ S and ∑s xs = 1}. State x∗ ∈ ∆S is a Nash equilibrium if (x − x∗) · F(x∗) ≤
0 for all x ∈ ∆S. Static stability in this setting is conceptualized as a property of con-
traction of payoff function F = (Fs)s∈S , namely negative semidefiniteness of its Jacobian
DF: z · DF(x)z ≤ 0 for all z ∈ RS.. A game is called a contractive game if contraction
property holds globally, i.e., at any x ∈ ∆S.
While it is proven for each of canonical evolutionary dynamics such as the best re-
sponse dynamic and excess payoff dynamics that contraction guarantees asymptotic sta-
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bility of the set of Nash equilibria (Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2009), Zusai (2020) presents
a unifying general proof that covers any evolutionary dynamic as long as agents’ revi-
sion of strategies is “rationalizable”, i.e., a new strategy after each revision can be ex-
plained as a constrained optimal choice, albeit the new strategy may not maximize the
payoff, by introducing a (possibly stochastic) switching cost to rationalize reluctance to
switch and also a (possibly stochastic) restriction to available strategies to rationalize a
switch to a suboptimal strategy. Then, Zusai (2020) defines a net gain from revision by
subtracting the switching cost from payoff improvement by the switch and finds that the
aggregate net gain G attains zeros (only) at Nash equilibria and also it is coupled with a
negative definite function H : ∆S → R such that5
DG(x)ẋ = H(x) + ẋ · DF(x)ẋ for any x ∈ ∆S, ẋ ∈ V(x).
Contraction implies DG(x)ẋ ≤ H(x), so we can apply Theorem 1 to G as a Lyapunov
function and H as a decay rate function. Our theorem covers both a global case (i.e., a
contraction game) and a local case in which the contraction property holds only in some
neighborhood of an equilibrium set. So, this argument provides a single proof for global
stability of the set of Nash equilibria in the former case and local stability of a Nash equi-
librium in the latter case. The neighborhood for local contraction is identified only from
information about the game, especially, F, though a forward invariant neighborhood
needs identification of a solution trajectory.
Speaking about local stability in a game, an evolutionary stable state (ESS) is the
classical static stability concept in particular to evolutionary game theory. While the
contraction property is locally satisfied at an ESS (or its weaker version, a neutrally stable
state) if it lies in the interior of ∆S, a weaker version of contraction has been considered
to cover the boundary case Taylor and Jonker (1978): x is called a regular ESS if 1)
Fu(x∗) < max{Fs(x∗) | s ∈ S} for any u ∈ U∗ := {s ∈ S | x∗s = 0}.
and 2) there exists a neighborhood of x∗ in which each point x satisfies
z · DF(x)z ≤ 0 for any z ∈ RSU∗ := {z ∈ R
S | x∗u = 0⇒ zu = 0} .
Here U∗ is the set of strategies that are unused at x∗. 1) means that none of those strate-
gies is indeed optimal at x∗. Condition 2) essentially means contraction but it is weak-
ened to require the contraction only when those strategies in U∗ are kept unused.
Sandholm (2010a) suggests for pairwise comparison dynamics and the standard best
response dynamic that, once we can somehow obtain a Lyapunov function for a contrac-
tive game, we can use it to construct that for a regular ESS. To fill the gap by weakening
the requirement of contraction, he suggests to add (a sufficiently large scalar multiple of)
the mass of players of those strategies in U∗, i.e., MU∗(x) := ∑u∈U∗ xu, to the Lyapunov
5See Zusai (2020) for an exact definition of G.
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function. By applying Corollary 1 to the combination of G in Zusai (2020) and MU∗ in
Sandholm (2010a), we can generalize dynamic stability of a regular ESS to a wide class
of rationalizable evolutionary dynamics.
4 Literature review
Lyapunov’s direct method
Here we clarify the merit of our own version of the Lyapunov’s direct method theorem
from comparison with preceding versions of the theorem.
As we have repeatedly stated, the technical difference lies in not requiring the prior
knowledge on a forward invariance neighborhood. Actually this issue has been over-
looked. Lyapunov’s direct method is typically proven for global stability (i.e., condition
(1) holds globally); see Bacciotti and Ceragioli (1999) and Clarke et al. (1998, Theorem
5.5) for global stability of a single point. Then, we easily expect its analogous result to
hold for a local case. It is not trivial as we discussed and highlighted.—It is indeed a
matter when trying to use a transitivity theorem.
When local stability of a set is explicitly argued, a similar condition such that
W(xt) ≤W(xt′) whenever t ≥ t′ ≥ 0 and x0 ∈ X (2)
or
Ẇ(xt) ≤ W̃(xt) at any t ≥ 0 whenever x0 ∈ X (3)
is imposed; see Benaı̈m et al. (2005, Prop. 3.25) and Zusai (2018, Theorem 7). If X′ is
forward invariant, then (1) implies these conditions. The current version weakens the
assumption of the forward invariance and thus applies to cases in which the neighbor-
hood X is not known a priori. Yet, we retrieve asymptotic stability of X∗ by obtaining a
forward invariant subset of X′.
It may be possible to restrict the domain of W and W̃ to X′. Then, one might easily
conclude that, with some constant w̄, a lower contour set W−1([0, w̄]) should serve as a
forward invariant set since condition (1) would imply that W cannot increase as in (2)
and (3); see Hale (1980, pp.313–4) for a proof for local stability of an isolated equilibrium
point under a differential equation and Smirnov (2001, Theorem 8.2) for that under a
differential inclusion, both presuming that this argument works. However, this argu-
ment presumes that condition (1)always holds along with a solution trajectory to derive
(3) from (1) as argued above. This argument still misses the possibility that a trajectory
starting from X′ may escape from X′. We are questioning this presumption and fix the
hole, while also extending pointwise stability as in Smirnov (2001) to set-wise stability.
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Transitivity theorem
One might (wrongly) argue that conditions a) and b) in Corollary 1 imply asymptotic
stability of X2 with X1 as a monotone decreasing neighborhood and that of X∗ with X2,
by applying only Theorem 1. From this chain relationship, one might want to use the
standard transitivity theorem as in Conley (1978) as we argued in Section 1. However,
Conley’s theorem requires both forward and strongly negatively invariance of interim
set X2. However, a monotone decreasing neighborhood may not be invariant and thus
we cannot apply Conley’s theorem. Furthermore, we do not assume openness of the
interim set X2; in the application to a regular ESS, it is indeed a hyperplane defined by
∑u∈U∗ xu = 0. The openness of monotone decreasing set X′ is crucial for our Theorem
1, since we eventually construct a smaller forward invariant set within the monotone
decreasing set.6 So, we cannot apply Theorem 1 to obtain asymptotic stability of X∗
from condition b). We resolve these issues by reconstructing a Lyapunov function.
5 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Here we prove the difference from Zusai (2018, Theorem 7), which assumes (3).
For this, we focus on the case of X′ ( X and find a forward invariant subset of X′. Once
we find it, any Carathéodory solution starting from the forward invariant subset remains
there and thus satisfies (3) as (1) holds for x = xt at each time t ∈ R+. Then, Zusai (2018,
Theorem 7) is applied and assures asymptotic stability of X∗ while having the forward
invariant subset as a basin of attraction.
First, construct a distance from point x ∈ X to X∗ based on the metric on X , say




Since X∗ is a non-empty compact set and d(x, x∗) is continuous in x∗ when x is fixed,
Weierstrass theorem assures the existence of the minimum in the above definition of
d∗(x). This d∗ satisfies
d∗(x) ≥ 0; d∗(x) = 0 ⇔ x ∈ X∗.




6Specifically, in our proof, we use openness of monotone decreasing neighborhood X′ to confirm the
existence and (nonzero) positiveness of d̄, i.e., the shortest distance from X∗ to get out of X′. In case X′ is















Figure 3: Sets in the proof of Theorem 1. X∗ is the black area in the center and X′′ is the
light gray area. cl X′ is the entire oval, with the outermost outline. X′0 is the dark gray
area, including the both boundaries.
Maximum theorem guarantees continuity of d∗ : X → R+ by continuity of d(x, x∗)
in both x and x∗. Besides, X \ X′ is a non-empty compact subset by X′ ( X and the
openness of X′. Hence, the minimum in (4) exists. It follows that
d̄ > 0; d∗(x) < d̄ ⇒ x ∈ X′. (5)
Define set X′0 ⊂ cl X′ by
X′0 := cl X
′ ∩ d∗−1([d̄/2, ∞)).
Since both cl X′ and d∗−1([d̄/2, ∞)) are closed, X′0 is closed and thus compact in X . It
is not empty, as proven here. Suppose X′0 = ∅; then, any x ∈ X with d∗(x) ≥ d̄/2
must be out of cl X′. On the other hand, since cl X′ is not empty, X′ has at least one
boundary point x0; then, d∗(x0) ≥ d̄.7 By the former statement, this implies x0 /∈ cl X′
but it contradicts with x0 being on the boundary of X′; hence, X′0 cannot be empty.




Since X′0 is compact and nonempty and W is (Lipschitz) continuous, the minimum exists.
Furthermore, it is positive; we have X′0 ⊂ cl X′ by construction and W(x) ≥ 0 for all
x ∈ cl X′ by condition (a) and continuity of W, while no element x ∈ X′0 belongs to X∗
since d∗(x) ≥ d̄ > 0 for any x ∈ X′0. Because X∗ = cl X′ ∩W−1(0) by condition (b) and
X′0 ⊂ cl X′, this implies x ∈ X′0 ⇒ W(x) > 0. Hence we have w̄ > 0. By the definition of
7We can make a sequence converging to x0 from elements out of X′, whose distance from X∗ cannot be
smaller than d̄ by (4).
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w̄, we have [
x ∈ cl X′ and d∗(x) ≥ d̄/2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
i.e., x∈X′0
⇒ W(x) ≥ w̄. (6)
Define set X′′ ⊂ X′ by
X′′ = W−1([0, w̄) ∩ X′. (7)
This set is an open neighborhood of X∗ by X∗ ⊂ X′′, since W = 0 at anywhere in X∗
and X∗ ⊂ X′. Now we prove that X′′ is wholly contained in set d−1∗ ([0, d̄/2)). Assume
that there exists x ∈ X′′ such that d∗(x) ≥ d̄/2. These jointly imply W(x) ≥ w̄ by (6)
since x ∈ X′′ ⊂ X′ ⊂ cl X′. However, this contradicts with W(x) ∈ [0, w̄) for x to belong
to X′′. Hence, we have
x ∈ X′′ ⇒ d∗(x) < d̄/2. (8)
Now we prove X′′ is forward invariant; remind that X′ may not be forward invariant
and thus it is not trivial to confirm that a trajectory from X′′ stays in X′. To verify it by
contradiction, assume that there is a Carathéodory solution trajectory {xt} starting from
X′′ but escaping X′′ at some moment of time:
x0 ∈ X′′, and xT /∈ X′′ at some T > 0. (9)
The statement xT /∈ X′′ means xT /∈ X′ or W(xT) ≥ w̄ by (7). In the former case, we have
d∗(xT) ≥ d̄ by (4) while d∗(x0) < d̄/2 by (8). By continuity of d∗(x) in x and of xt in t
on a Carathéodory solution trajectory {xt}, d∗(xt) is continuous in t; hence, there exists
a moment of time T′ ∈ (0, T) such that d∗(xT′) = 0.9d̄ ∈ (0.5d̄, d̄) ⊂ (d∗(x0), d∗(xT)). At
this point, xT′ /∈ X′′ by (8) while xT′ ∈ X′ by (5); thus, W(xT′) ≥ w̄ by (7). Hence, the first
case of escaping X′′ implies the existence of T′ > 0 such that
W(xT′) ≥ w̄ and xT′ ∈ X′.
In the second (but not the first) case, we have W(xT) ≥ w̄ but xT ∈ X′; that is, the above
statement holds with T′ = T.
The above two conditions on T′ implies the existence of T̄ ∈ (0, T′] such that
W(xT̄) ≥ w̄, and
[
xt ∈ X′ for all t < T̄
]
. (10)
To prove it, assume xt′ /∈ X′ at some t′ < T′, i.e., the negation of the latter condition
with T̄ = T′; if there is no such t′ ≤ T′, then it suggests that the claim (10) holds at
T̄ = T′ by the fact W(xT′) ≥ w̄. By (5), the hypothesis xt′ /∈ X′ implies d∗(xt′) ≥ d̄.
Again, by continuity of d∗(xt) in t, the set {t ≤ t′ | d∗(xt) ≥ d̄} is closed and thus
compact. This implies the existence of the minimum T̄ in this set, and further T̄ > 0
by the fact d∗(x0) < d̄/2. That is, we have d∗(xt) < d̄ for all t < T̄ while d∗(xT̄) = d̄.
The former implies xt ∈ X′ for all t < T̄ by (5) and the latter implies W(xT̄) ≥ w̄ by
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xT̄ = limt→T̄ xt ∈ cl X′ and (6). Thus, the above claim (10) holds at this T̄ ∈ (0, T′].
Since condition (a) and (1) hold almost everywhere in X′, we have Ẇ(xτ) ≤ W̃(xτ) ≤





Since W(x0) < w̄ by x0 ∈ X′′, we have W(xT̄) < w̄ in (10). This contradicts with W(xT̄) ≥
w̄.
Therefore, the hypothesis (9) cannot hold: any Carathéodory solution trajectory {xt}
starting from X′′ cannot escape X′′ at any moment of time. That is, X′′ is forward invari-
ant.
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Define a Lyapunov function W : X → R and a decaying rate function W̃ : X → R
by
W(x) := 2W1(x) + W2(x), W̃(x) := 2W̃1(x) + W̃2(x) for each x ∈ X1.
Lipschitz continuity of W1 and W2 and lower semicontinuity of W̃1 and W̃2 are succeeded
to those of W and W̃, respectively. It is immediate from assumptions a-i,iv), b-i,iv) and
c) to see that
W(x) = 2W1(x) + W2(x) ≥ 0,
W̃(x) = W̃1(x) + {W̃1(x) + W̃2(x)} ≤ 0,
DW(x)ẋ = 2DW1(x)ẋ + DW2(x)ẋ ≤ 2W̃1(x) + W̃2(x) = W̃(x) (11)
for any x ∈ X1, ẋ ∈ V(x) (for the last equation assuming that W1 and W2 are differen-
tiable at x).
Further, since X∗ ⊂ X2, it follows assumptions a-iii) and b-iii) that W(x) = W̃(x) = 0
if x ∈ X∗; thus X∗ is contained in cl X1 ∩W−1(0) and cl X1 ∩ W̃−1(0) by X∗ ⊂ X2 ⊂
X1 ⊂ cl X1. In contrary, assume W(x) = 0 at x ∈ cl X1 first. By assumptions a-i) and
b-i), it must be the case that W1(x) = 0 and W2(x) = 0. The former implies x ∈ cl X2
by assumption a-iii). Together with this, the latter implies x ∈ X∗ by assumption b-iii).
Separately from this, now assume W̃(x) = 0 at x ∈ cl X1. By assumptions a-ii) and
c), it must be the case that W̃1(x) = 0 and W̃1(x) + W̃2(x) = 0.9 The former implies
x ∈ cl X2 by assumption a-iii); besides, by plugging the former into the latter, we have
W̃2(x) = 0. These two statements jointly imply x ∈ X∗ by assumption b-iii). In sum, we
8A Carathéodory solution trajectory is differentiable at almost all moments of time, though it may not
be so at all moments.
9Note that the latter condition alone cannot assure W̃2(x) = 0, since W̃2(x) could take a positive value
unless x is in X2.
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have verified
cl X1 ∩W−1(0) = cl X1 ∩ W̃−1(0) = X∗. (12)
Note that the first equality is due to the fact that X∗ ⊂ X1 and thus X∗ ∩ bd X1 = ∅
since X1 is open.
We have verified all the assumptions in Theorem 1; therefore, X∗ is asymptotically
stable. Notice that X1 may not be forward invariant, but part i) of Theorem 1 assures that
we can make some subset of X1 as a basin of attraction to X∗.
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